Three years of Pep Guardiola at Bayern Munich – a success or a major disappointment?

After an extremely successful period with numerous titles at FC Barcelona, Pep Guardiola came to Munich in 2013. At only his second coaching station, he took over a club that had been just as historically successful as FC Barcelona and had just won the European treble under Jupp Heynckes a few months earlier. Bayern had thus completed the most successful season in the club’s history right before Guardiola’s arrival.

So what did Guardiola do?

From the outset, he misjudged the strengths of the Bayern squad. The style of play during the treble season under Heynckes was defined by brilliant tactics, perfectly tailored to the team. With that system, Bayern managed to beat Barcelona 7-0 over two legs. Although Guardiola was no longer coaching Barça at that time, he had significantly shaped the Tiki-Taka style they played. Heynckes, however, had already recognized how to successfully counter that style of play.

After taking office, Guardiola reshaped the entire team structure and replaced Heynckes’ successful football—which combined modern tactics, quick counterattacks, and collective pressing—with his own possession-based system. His ruthlessness and fixation on his own concept quickly became apparent, especially with the departure of Toni Kroos, who became one of Real Madrid’s most important players. Guardiola’s argument that Kroos wanted to leave is unconvincing. Any top coach would have fought to keep such a player.

Did Bastian Schweinsteiger really have to go as well? As a second-half substitute, he could still have been valuable. At the 2014 World Cup, he was one of Germany’s top three players in the final two matches. A great coach must not only possess tactical and psychological skills but also vision—and the awareness that a player like Schweinsteiger can still be decisive in important matches.

Not without reason, the German sports press often said that even a far less capable coach could have easily won the league with this squad.

The Champions League, however, presented a real challenge. At that level, success is not only about player quality—since in the knockout rounds teams are generally evenly matched. At that stage, what makes the difference is:

• Better tactical planning. The tactics must be based on what the coach has implemented in previous matches and what he has observed in the opponent. If a team primarily trains in possession football and lacks components such as counterattacks, it cannot implement tactics it hasn’t practiced. The players simply won’t master that style.

• A functioning team structure, where everyone knows what to do, when, and where.

• Avoiding incorrect positioning, as even one wrong position can disrupt team synergy.

• A well-rehearsed squad with fresh energy, joy in playing, and a comprehensive fair-play system.

All of this is the coach’s responsibility. Whether it was wise that Bayern secured such a large lead in the Bundesliga during Guardiola’s first two seasons—thus reducing the necessary tension when the more important Champions League matches came around—is debatable.

Since many of these principles were not consistently followed by Guardiola, Bayern lost all three semifinals under his leadership—against Real Madrid (Ancelotti), FC Barcelona (Luis Enrique), and Atlético Madrid (Diego Simeone). The last loss against Atlético happened because Pep forgot that in the Champions League knockout system, the first match is often the decisive one. Leaving out Thomas Müller in the first leg in Madrid for questionable tactical reasons was a serious mistake. Müller, alongside Lewandowski, had been one of the deadliest attacking duos in Europe that season. The psychological impact of this exclusion on Müller in the following matches should not be underestimated.

Some experts claim that Guardiola made many players better. We disagree. At this level, players should refine their strengths—not have proven automatisms disrupted. Changes must always be made with great sensitivity—especially when it comes to systems that have been 100% successful. Guardiola too often deployed players outside of their ideal roles. For instance, Philipp Lahm, one of the best defenders in the world, was average when moved to midfield. His true value was clearly visible again during Germany’s final matches in Brazil, where he returned to defense. Even Robert Lewandowski only found his rhythm and connection with Müller after Robben’s injury—and without Pep’s help. The declining relevance of Mario Götze also falls on Guardiola. It is hard to imagine that one of the greatest talents of the last 50 years failed at Bayern without the coach bearing part of the responsibility.

This is where a coach must act decisively: either stand by a player or let him go. A coach has the power to unsettle any player. Imagine if Messi or Ronaldo had been benched regularly—along with signals from outside the pitch showing a lack of trust. It would have psychological consequences.

The rule that some people would rather be “right” than successful applies fully to Guardiola.

Even in the transfer market, he didn’t always show a good instinct. His signings of Xabi Alonso, Benatia, and Bernat were not very successful. It was only with Kingsley Coman and Arturo Vidal that he made strong moves—though by then, it was already too late.

To be fair: not everything was bad. Guardiola certainly brought international flair to the Bundesliga. Against the only real rival at the time—Borussia Dortmund—he consistently delivered good results, something even Heynckes hadn’t always achieved. Nevertheless, we had higher expectations for the Champions League. Had Guardiola played to the natural strengths of his team, at least one Champions League title would have likely been possible—instead of three semifinal exits.

We will watch closely how Guardiola performs in Manchester. One thing is certain: success is mandatory if he wants to maintain his reputation as a “super coach.”